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SUMMARY
Based on various law sources, the American common law is connected by a particular role of 
prior judicial rulings as a basis of judicial practice. The principle of stare decisis, which exists with-
in its framework, leads to considering decisions of courts of higher instances as binding (settled in 
a binding manner of a given case type in the convention of res iudicata). However, it does not mean 
that precedents may not be amended or broken. In such a situation following factors may appear: 
defective rulings, triggering incoherent or unjust consequences, contraction with other precedents, 
and change of circumstances, which have led to a precedent decision to be taken.
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“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience… The law em-
bodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be 
dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathemat-
ics”1. This statement by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., sums up not only the 
1 O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Boston 1881, p. 1.
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underlying philosophy of the common law system. It also posits the reason behind 
the principle of stare decisis and emphasizes its importance in that system. To that 
extent, it is the principle of stare decisis allows the court to incorporate common 
sense into its decision-making philosophy while at the same time supporting con-
sistency and stability in the law.
It is important to understand that the “common law” of the United States is itself 
derived from several sources, primarily court decisions that become the precedents 
for judicial decision-making. Philosophically, the writings of Montesquieu and 
John Locke provided the basis for the division of governmental power referred 
to as “the separation of powers”. Their focus was on a division of power between 
the executive (the king in both cases) and the legislative branches of government. 
The judicial function was viewed then, and now in civil law jurisdictions, as an 
extension of the legislative branch. Its only function was to enforce the laws as 
written, and there was not discretion in the judges to interpret the law in relation to 
changing times. In part because of the colonial experience with a judicial system 
that was appointed in London, the idea grew in the United States that it might be 
a good idea to establish the judiciary as a separate and co-equal branch of the gov-
ernmental structure. Indeed, this is perhaps the most revolutionary development 
in government that the Constitution implemented. It is important to note that this 
innovation was regarded with some skepticism at the time. The notion of judges 
who would be appointed, not elected, in effect for life was disquieting to many in 
the young country. It was in response to these anxieties that Alexander Hamilton 
wrote Federalist No. 78, one of a series of essays in support of the new Consti-
tution. In it, he acknowledged that this was something of a novelty in political 
thinking, but he espoused the view that with the division of power in the executive 
and legislative departments, the judiciary would be “the least dangerous branch”. 
That viewpoint, however, supports the historical reality that led to the creation in 
1787 of The Constitution of The United States itself and its role in the common 
law process. Simply put, the tripartite framework of the Constitution was a pop-
ular reaction to the ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation to provide an 
adequate post-Revolutionary government.
It should be remembered that it had only been fourteen years since the end of 
a bitter war for independence from Great Britain, fueled as it was by the Declaration 
of Independence. It is hardly surprising that the government that the Constitution 
designed was meant to implement the rights of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” while still being a functioning government in the real world. That was 
the principal objective of the first seven Articles of the Constitution. They set up 
the framework of a government that, being tripartite in structure, would do two 
things: first, it would function as a government in the usual tasks that government 
does, such as military and taxation; second, be capable of protecting the rights of 
the citizenry that had been fought for in the Revolutionary War. That this was part 
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of the intent of the Framers is clear from the fact that the Bill of Rights was to be 
promulgated as the first act of the new Congress in 1791. After all, collectively, 
these amendments became the definition of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness” that limited just how far the government could intrude into the lives of 
the citizenry. The passage of the Bill of Rights was, of course, part of the original 
compromise that brought the Constitution into being, so it is proper to regard them 
as part of the original document. Indeed, the focus of the combined seven Articles 
and the first ten Amendments is clear from the language that they begin with “We, 
the People” and conclude with “to the people”. In effect, the Constitution of the 
United States embodies the heritage of the Declaration of Independence that the 
rights and liberties of the people come from the people and are not bestowed, and 
therefore subject to arbitrary alteration, by the government. Because the document 
was created, and ultimately adopted, by elected representatives of the people of 
the original states and not by the government then in power, it can be asserted that 
the Constitution itself is part of the common law of the United States and therefore 
conditions the juridical process that implements it. It is from this point that the 
common law, as it is understood and has evolved in the United States, originates.
On the one hand, stare decisis is the legal principle in use in the United States 
and other common law jurisdictions that dictates that under normal circumstances 
the prior and previous decisions of higher courts shall be followed and not changed. 
All courts, particularly trial courts, are charged with maintaining and following this 
principle as they hear cases at whatever level when the facts and legal arguments 
are presented to them. There are two types of stare decisis: vertical and horizontal. 
Vertical stare decisis is when the highest appellate court in your state or country 
rules on an issue, lower courts are bound to that particular judgment. Horizontal 
stare decisis occurs when a trial court of similar stature in your judicial district 
rules in a particular manner, a sister court, on the same issue, will follow the ruling 
of that court.
While the focus of stare decisis, in general, is on what might be called “external” 
precedents, there is an “internal” component of stare decisis that sometimes impacts 
how the lawyer in the common law system will handle the case. This doctrine is 
known as “law of the case”, and it is the clearest example of stare decisis applied 
internally to a single case as it moves through the system. This situation arises when 
a case is remanded back to a lower court, whether trial or appellate, from a higher 
appellate court after the higher court has decided part of the case. The “law of the 
case” doctrine is “that principle under which questions of law decided on appeal 
to a court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages”2. It 
applies only to questions of law. In such an instance, that part of the case that was 
determined by the higher court may not be relitigated in the case and will, by defi-
2 Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. 2003).
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nition, form part of the basis for the final judgment. A similar, though “external”, 
subset of stare decisis is res iudicata, literally “the thing has been adjudicated”. 
This happens when a later case is brought that involves either some of the same 
facts or the same parties or both as were in an earlier case that has been finally 
decided. In such a situation, the second court can resolve the case in whole or in 
part by disposing of those issues and parties that were taken care of in the earlier 
case in the interest of judicial economy and uniformity of result. Obviously, the 
parties to the lawsuit have from the appellate court a taste of stare decisis in their 
own case and, thus, a glimpse of the future of the case should it go back through 
the appellate process. In this instance, the law of the case doctrine combines for 
the parties the characteristics of consistency and finality in the subsequent life of 
the litigation, regardless of where it might go.
Horizontal, vertical, law of the case, and res iudicata aspects of stare decisis 
are combined with the “stacking effect” of prior decisions in that the lower court, 
which is usually a trial court, must accept and obey the rulings and precedents 
of the courts above it in the superior jurisdiction. This means that trial courts are 
obligated to obey appellate court and supreme court decisions; whereas, appellate 
courts are bound to recognize and follow the rulings of the supreme court. It is, 
however, recognized that courts, while generally charged to following previous 
decisions, may change or alter those decisions. In the event that a change is sought 
by any party to the controlling law as dictated by stare decisis, then the Supreme 
Court, as the final arbiter of the law, is the body that has the ultimate authority 
to change or completely overrule the existing precedent and set new standards in 
the law. Any change in existing law made by the Supreme Court then becomes 
the precedent to be followed from that point forward according to the principle of 
stare decisis. Indeed, it may be that, depending upon the issue, as the case moves 
upward through the appellate process, the focus of the effort shifts from merely 
reversing the decision of the trial court to changing public policy itself in a given 
area. At that point, the importance of stare decisis may be somewhat diminished 
because in the common law environment the trial judge has wide discretion that 
may impact how the appellate courts deal with the case.
A lawyer engaged in the private practice of civil law in the United States is af-
fected by this doctrine because virtually all of those cases are bound by the existing 
common law, or law dictated by courts in their decisions in previous similar cases, 
as opposed to statutory law wherein the cases are decided by a statutory standard. 
At the outset of representation, a lawyer must consider the common law as it applies 
to the case in order to give the best advice to the client. In other words, if a lawyer 
needs to know how his or her case will be judged, what the outcome may be and 
what must be done to prove the case, the lawyer would look at decisions made by 
courts in similar cases instead of looking in the statutes for the exact “black letter 
law” governing a specific set of circumstances. This is the principal contrast of 
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between the American civil common law system and the civil law in Continental 
Europe which, for the most part, uses a form of law more similar to code law or 
statutory law.
In the common law system, because the statutes and the case law precedents are 
always evolving, particularly in relation to the facts of a case, there will be cases 
where it appears that the book of rules has run out. The result is that the judge is 
left with few guidelines other than a basic sense of right and wrong and, sometimes, 
a sensitivity to the notion that courts are inherently human institutions designed to 
meet human needs. For the judge in such a circumstance, the essence of the com-
mon law system is summed up, as Justice Benjamin Cardozo once said, “We must 
not only do justice, we must be seen to be doing justice”. For example, in 1988, 
at the height of the AIDS scare, a publicly supported hospital in Texas refused to 
provide AIDS victims with a then-experimental drug called AZT at no cost because 
it had not been fully government approved. All of the other hospitals in the area 
had provided the drug at no cost, apparently without regard to the governmental 
non-approval. A case was brought against the government and the hospital to force it 
to give the drug to AIDS victims. As the attorneys argued, the courtroom filled with 
people in various stages of the illness, some covered with sores, some coughing, all 
dying. The judge, realizing that there were no precedents, no statutes, no rules, to 
provide guidance in this case, had to look to ancient law for support. The Roman 
doctrine of parens patriae provided the mechanism for the decision. As the court 
said from the bench, “[…] from time to time, the court must be to some extent the 
voice of the community. That voice […] must be, and is, raised in favor of life”. It 
then ordered the hospital to dispense the drug without further delay.
This evolutionary characteristic of Anglo-American jurisprudence permits the 
courts to serve an “announcement of public policy” function that is, in the United 
States, co-equal with the executive and legislative branches of government. To 
that extent, this function of the courts is a legitimate extension of the U.S. Con-
stitution, though it was not initially anticipated that this would be the case. It was 
not until 1803 that the U.S. Supreme Court established itself as co-equal with the 
other branches of the government with the pronouncement, “It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is” in the 
familiar words of Marbury v. Madison3. While it is customary to think of “judicial 
review” as the principal result of Marbury, it should be obvious that, whether it 
is the result of the evaluation of statutes or regulations or the Constitution itself. 
In the exercise of this function, the Supreme Court has the ability to announce 
alterations in public policy with just as much force as an act of Congress or an 
executive order would possess, and this is the situation in which the concept of 
stare decisis comes into play.
3 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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An American lawyer who is of the opinion that the existing common law is 
unjust and decides to make an attempt to change the law, would file the case in the 
trial court and obtain a verdict from the judge or jury and a judgment from the court. 
Because of stare decisis, the law that is being sought to be changed would control 
my case. If the judgment were unfavorable to the outcome that the lawyer is trying 
to obtain, the case would be appealed to the next level, the appellate court. If that 
did result in a reversal of the “bad” judgment, it would be a victory of changing 
the law. In the event that the “bad” judgment was upheld, the case would then go 
on to the Supreme Court where it would hear the legal arguments. Its judgment 
would be the final word. If the Supreme Court should be of the opinion that the 
law needed to be changed, they would enter a judgment in favor of the party asking 
for the change. There would now exist a new precedent, a new public policy, and 
a new law that would then have to be followed from that moment on by all other 
courts pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.
While this process is essentially the same whether in civil or criminal cases, 
there are some examples where stare decisis is not as fixed a principle as it would 
appear. Indeed, it can be argued that it is in the criminal law where there is an 
intersection between common sense and stare decisis as a product of the various 
protections for defendants that arise in the Bill of Rights. An example of this is 
the “exclusionary rule” as it relates to the admissibility of evidence in a criminal 
trial. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches as 
seizures. Such a restriction has been a rock-solid rule in the criminal law for a very 
long time. Its origins can be traced to the case of U.S. v. Burr4 (commonly referred to 
as “the Aaron Burr Case”). The case is quite long and covers many topics, particu-
larly the definition of treason, but that is not all. The case also focused on whether 
or not certain evidence had been properly obtained by the investigating authorities. 
The court determined that the papers were defective and thus in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence was excluded. Aaron Burr was acquitted. 
While this at first appears to be an overly technical decision, it reflects a reading 
of the U.S. Constitution that was consistent with the protection of the civil rights 
of the defendant. This concept was formalized in Weeks v. United States, a case in 
which a person had been convicted with evidence that had been acquired without 
a warrant or otherwise constitutional process5. Because of the violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the conviction was reversed. This principle was applied to the 
states in Mapp v. Ohio6. Together, these three cases created a very clear statement 
of public policy that law enforcement had to be wary of, or else their efforts might 
be rendered worthless.
4 25 Fed. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (Opinion of Marshall, C.J.).
5 231 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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An extension of the exclusionary rule is the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doc-
trine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States7. This is an 
example of common sense as being integral to the concept of stare decisis. Under 
this doctrine, any evidence that is taken without proper authority is excluded, but 
so is any other evidence that is derived from an illegal search or seizure. All of 
this, however, was subject to being changed. In 1984, there was a series of cases 
that created “exceptions” to the exclusionary rule and, though they softened the 
precedents, did not entirely do away with the exclusionary rule. These were Nix v. 
Williams (inevitable discovery by police), United States v. Leon (warrant invalid- 
ated subsequent to search), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard (“good-faith” belief by 
the police that the warrant covered the items seized)8. In effect, these three cases 
shifted the public policy much more in favor of the police than the defendant, thus 
creating a new chain of stare decisis on which lawyers must now rely. While stare 
decisis is a doctrine of law that does not permit settled law to be upset, the United 
States Supreme Court has severely diluted the doctrine by creating exceptions to 
the doctrine that almost obliterate the rule.
Article III of the Constitution vests the whole judicial power in the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts created by Congressional legislation. The original 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was outlined in the original article, but it has 
been steadily reduced in scope with the passage of time so that in fact the over-
whelming majority of its cases are appellate cases. The question of whether to 
retain and follow established precedent or to overturn it and begin a new line of 
precedent lands squarely on the shoulders of the Supreme Court from time to time. 
When the Supreme Court significantly alters precedent, especially to the point of 
eliminating it altogether, whether in civil or criminal cases, there is often the ten-
dency to think that such changes are politically motivated. Studies, however, have 
shown that in many instances the judiciary is in fact quite closely attuned to the 
views of the people at large and is sometimes in advance of major shift is public 
policy. Precedent in the common law system can, however, be overruled by the 
court at any level if the public policy factors for doing so are sufficiently weighty. 
Among these factors are: 1) the original rule or decision was flawed; 2) the appli-
cation of the prior rule can lead to and has led to inconsistent results, thus belying 
one of the underlying justifications for stare decisis in the first place; 3) the rule 
conflicts with other precedent in some respect, especially if there is a newer and 
better-reasoned case; 4) the rule regularly produces an unjust result unanticipated 
by the original decision or places an unnecessary burden on the system; or 5) the 
reasons that supported the precedent in its original form no longer exist because 
7 371 U.S. 471, 83 S. Ct. 407, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1963).
8 467 U.S. 443 (1984), 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and 468 U.S. 981 (1984), respectively.
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of the passage of time9. It can also be that, in the event that the legal basis of the 
rule has been changed or abolished, the precedential value of the prior decision has 
been undermined and may be overruled. For example, the ratification in 1865 of 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution abolishing slavery had the effect of 
overruling sub silentio the Dred Scott Decision of 1857 that had been a factor in 
precipitating the War Between the States. At the Constitutional level, the overruling 
of precedent can occur either in the amendment process or by legislation. Either 
way, the independence of the judiciary is not impacted but is in fact reinforced by 
having the opportunity to create afresh precedents that will serve as stare decisis 
in the new legal context.
While in theory stare decisis is a jurisprudential tenet that lends stability to the 
law, judges can, and sometimes do, alter the jurisprudential value of stasis in the 
law based on their particular political leanings. For example, if the majority of the 
judges on a particular appellate court have been appointed by one political party 
and, as the majority, fashion the decision their way, they are seen to be judicial 
activists by their opponents. The product of their majority opinion may be viewed 
as judicial legislation, i.e., judicial activism, leading to much debate about its le-
gitimacy. That said, there are times when the courts must be “activist”, particularly 
when the other two branches of the government fail to act.
It is perhaps a desire to have some stability in an otherwise rather untidy po-
litical system that makes stare decisis so important. One practical political effect 
of the American Revolution was to extend governmental power to a third branch 
of government, the judiciary, as an expression of the concept that this was to be 
a government of laws and not of men. It is stare decisis that lies at the base of that 
distinction and provides both consistency and finality in the operation of the judicial 
system, and it is common sense that allows the system of precedent to evolve as 
the society requires.
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STRESZCZENIE
Amerykańskie common law, kształtujące się na gruncie różnorodnych źródeł,wiąże się ze szcze-
gólną rolą wcześniejszego orzecznictwa jako podstawą praktyki sądowej. Istniejąca w jej ramach 
zasada stare decisis prowadzi do uznania decyzji sądów wyższych instancji jako wiążących (wiążąco 
9 Ex parte Lewis, 219 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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rozstrzygających dany typ sprawy w konwencji res iudicata). Nie oznacza to jednak, że precedensy 
nie mogą być zmienione i przełamane. Umożliwia to pojawienie się takich czynników, jak: wadliwość 
orzeczenia, wywołanie niespójnych lub niesłusznych (niesprawiedliwych) skutków, sprzeczność 
z innymi precedensami oraz zmiana okoliczności, które wywołały podjęcie decyzji precedensowej.
Słowa kluczowe: stare decisis; zdrowy rozsądek; prawo cywilne; prawo karne; amerykańska 
jurysprudencja
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